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Trade Diversion and Production Sharing
Sven W. Arndt1
The Lowe Institute of Political Economy
Claremont McKenna College
Abstract. This paper examines the repercussions of cross-border production sharing
for the welfare effects of preferential trade liberalization. In a general-equilibrium
context, a free trade agreement (FTA), which incorporates production sharing, raises
the likelihood of welfare improvement. Thus, two members of a free trade area, who
each have comparative disadvantage in the production of a final product relative to a
non-member, may nevertheless enjoy net trade creation if they jointly possess
comparative advantage in key components of that product. At a minimum, crossborder production sharing reduces the trade-diverting elements of an FTA. It
follows, that rules of origin, viewed as constraints on cross-border fragmentation,
augment the negative, trade-diverting elements of free trade areas.
JEL Classification: F11, F13, F15
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1. Introduction
As globalization spreads, markets are becoming more integrated across countries and
economic activities more linked and intertwined. Continuing progress in trade and
investment liberalization, as well as declining communication and transportation
costs, play an important role in this process. As economies become more open and
market access is improved, trade grows and production spreads across borders. As a
result, end products entering into international trade contain parts and components
from many countries.
The focus of this paper is on factors that inhibit and factors that encourage
cross-border sourcing and their implications for the welfare effects of preferential
trade liberalization. This is an important issue, because the welfare effects of crossborder production fragmentation are not independent of the trade policy regime.
Under conditions of free trade in a standard trade model, for example, cross-border
sourcing of components is welfare-enhancing. Its effects are analogous to those of
technical progress. In the context of a most-favored-nation tariff regime (MFN), on
the other hand, it may be welfare-reducing.2
The simplest models of preferential trade liberalization deal with trade in
products that are produced entirely within national boundaries. Comparative
advantage considerations then provide ready efficiency assessments and welfare
calculations. In this framework, trade creation arises when imports of a finished or
intermediate product from a partner country replace domestic production. Trade
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diversion, on the other hand, is associated with the shift of imports from low-cost
outsiders to higher-cost FTA partners. In this context, the welfare effects of
preferential trade liberalization are ambiguous.
Our interest, however, is in a deeper form of preferential trade liberalization,
one that facilitates production sharing across borders. Here, the comparison of
interest is not between the cost of producing an entire product in the countries
involved, but comparison between fully home-based production in the non-member
country and cross-border production sharing by the FTA members.
The intuition is that a country may be the world’s low-cost producer of a
product, without necessarily being the low-cost producer of every one of its
components. When production of the product shifts from a nationally integrated setup in the non-member country to a regionally fragmented production framework
inside the preference area, the trade creating and trade diverting elements are
rearranged in important ways.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a brief
review of the welfare effects of cross-border component sourcing under a variety of
trade policy regimes. Section 3 employs a two-country general-equilibrium trade
model to examine the effects of rules of origin, when these are interpreted as
interventions designed to prevent optimal component sourcing. Section 4 examines
the effects of cross-border component sourcing on domestic production and welfare
in a simple partial-equilibrium framework. Section 5 employs a three-country,
partial-equilibrium model to assess the extent of trade diversion in discriminatory
trade liberalization with and without component specialization. Section 6 concludes.
2. Production Sharing, the Trade Regime, and Welfare
The welfare effects of cross-border fragmentation and production sharing have
received considerable attention in the recent literature.3 Under conditions of free
trade, cross-border production sharing in either the import or the export sector of a
small country unambiguously raises national welfare as it extends specialization
from the level of products to that of parts, components and assembly. When it takes
place in a large country, it generates terms-of-trade effects, which may augment or
undermine the welfare effects of production sharing per se. Since it tends to increase
domestic output in the sector in which it occurs, it turns the terms of trade in favor of
the country when it takes place in the import sector and against it when it occurs in
the export sector.4 These tendencies are reinforced by complementary adjustments
in the trading partner, when that country is also large. Then, output of the good
subject to production sharing increases there as well, so that the price-depressing
effects are enhanced.5
In a small country, cross-border fragmentation is also welfare-creating when
it is part of a preferential trade agreement, and may thus turn an otherwise tradediverting PTA into a trade-creating one. For large countries, the effects of
production sharing on the terms of trade need to be taken into account along the lines
discussed above.
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The welfare effects of cross-border production fragmentation are ambiguous,
however, when it is introduced in the context of most-favored-nation (MFN) trade
policy. It is more likely to be welfare-reducing, the larger the wedge between the
tariff-inclusive domestic price and the world price. Technically, the condition for
welfare improvement is that the Rybzsynski line must be flatter than the relative
world price in the standard general equilibrium trade model.6
Cross-border sourcing has potentially important implications for how we
assess “exposure” to foreign competition of so-called non-tradables industries.
When production is fragmentable, goods and services that are non-tradable as such,
may contain parts and components that are. When a non-tradable good or service
contains tradable parts and components, its insulation from foreign competition is
reduced as the domestic factors of production employed in component production are
exposed to competition from abroad.
Cross-border production sharing and component sourcing by non-tradables
industries not only affect national welfare (by shifting out the production possibility
frontier in a manner similar to technological progress), but also have implications for
the real exchange rate, defined as the ratio of tradables prices to non-tradables prices.
It is well-known that market-clearing conditions in the non-tradables sector play a
key role in determining the real exchange rate (Arndt, 2004). Hence, when offshore
sourcing of tradable components reduces costs and thus prices of non-tradables
relative to tradables, the resultant increase in the ratio of tradables to non-tradables
prices is equivalent to a depreciation of the country’s real exchange rate. A shift to
offshore sourcing in the non-tradables sector is thus accompanied by real
depreciation of the country’s currency.
The ability of non-tradables producers to use offshore sourcing of
components to increase their competitiveness relative to tradables producers enables
them to compete more effectively for domestic resources, and thereby raises output
and employment in the non-tradables sector. Meanwhile, the depreciation of the
country’s real exchange rate, raises output in the tradables sector as well, implying
that offshore sourcing by non-tradables industries raises output throughout the
economy. The rise in tradables output and decline in tradables demand improve the
trade balance.
3. Rules of Origin
Rules of origin, also known as domestic-content requirements, are designed to
prevent producers in free trade areas from exploiting differences among members’
tariff levels through cross-border sourcing of components from non-members. If
country A has a lower tariff on component imports than its FTA partner, country B,
the producers in A may use components from non-members to gain a competitive
edge in B’s markets. Rules of origin are policies specifically designed to control
such offshore sourcing.
To the extent that rules of origin restrict country A’s producers from thirdcountry sourcing of parts and components, they cause the country’s production
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possibility curve to contract relative to its optimal, unconstrained position.7 We
examine the welfare implications with the aid of Figure 1. Suppose that the
production blocks represent the two countries, A and B, respectively, which have
formed a free trade area and that Pfta is the intra-FTA relative price. Assume for
simplicity that tastes are identical in the two countries, so that the initial equilibrium
consumption bundle for each nation is given at point Co. Production takes place at
points Qa and Qb, respectively, with country A exporting good Y and importing good
X. Suppose further that the conditions depicted by the two production blocks
involve offshore sourcing by both countries of components from low-cost nonmember sources.8
Suppose that country A enforces the rules-of-origin provisions of the treaty.
Producers in country B have two options, depending on the relative sizes of
applicable tariffs. They can continue to source components outside the FTA and pay
the partner’s tariff. They can, alternatively, shift the sourcing of components to FTA
suppliers in order to avoid the partner’s tariff on third-country value-added. The
latter will be the preferred course of action, if the cost savings inherent in thirdcountry sourcing are smaller than the tariff.
If the response is to shift component sourcing to intra-FTA suppliers, the
effect is to shift B’s production possibility curve inward along the X-axis to, say,
TB’. As a result, the intra-FTA price of X rises to Pfta’, which represents a worsening
of country A’s terms of trade. Production of good X rises in country A and falls in
country B. Consumption in both countries moves to a lower indifference curve to
reflect the welfare loss inflicted on both by country A’s implementation of the rulesof-origin requirements.9
Free trade areas are known to generate both trade-creating and trade-diverting
welfare changes. The latter may dominate the former and thus reduce welfare
relative to an MFN tariff regime. The foregoing suggests that rules of origin
introduce an additional element of trade diversion and thereby increase the likelihood
that an FTA will be welfare-reducing.
The situation is made still worse, if country B elects to enforce rules-of-origin
provisions against imports of good Y from country A that contain components from
non-member sources. If country A responds by shifting to domestic, higher-cost
components, then country A’s production block will shift inward along the Y-axis
and welfare will fall further in both countries.
Note, that while the common external tariff eliminates the need for rules of
origin in customs unions, determination of a non-zero common tariff may require
some countries to raise duties on component imports from non-members. To the
extent that this change inhibits component sourcing from non-members, it has the
effect of contracting members’ production possibility curves along the axes of
sectors engaged in such offshore sourcing and is thus welfare-reducing.
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4. Production Sharing and Trade Diversion
As noted above, preferential trade liberalization can be welfare-reducing on balance.
The question is whether cross-border fragmentation of production worsens or
improves the welfare effect of traditional preferential trade liberalization. It will be
recalled that in the traditional set-up, the shift of production from domestic producers
to the partner country is an important source of trade creation, while the shift of
production from the low-cost outsider to the partner country is the source of trade
diversion. From this perspective, therefore, a NAFTA-induced shift of U.S.
automobile imports from Japan to Mexico would clearly suggest trade diversion.
While such a conclusion is doubtlessly justified under the assumption that
automobiles are produced in their entirety in every country, it is less automatic under
conditions of cross-border fragmentation and production sharing between the partner
countries. Automobiles imported by the U.S. from Mexico contain components
made in the U.S. If Mexico is the low-cost producer of some component or of
assembly, then the shift of those activities from Japan to Mexico is an element of
trade creation. Any trade diversion can then arise only in the remainder of the
production chain. If the U.S. is the low-cost producer of the components it supplies
to Mexico, then the extent of trade creation is increased and the range of activities
subject to trade diversion is further limited. The net welfare effect of the shift in
production, which was once clearly negative, is now ambiguous.
The essential point of the foregoing is that unless Japan is the low-cost
producer of every activity in the production chain, cross-border fragmentation and
production sharing between the trade area partners reduces the trade-diverting
elements of preferential trade liberalization. The intuition may be set out with the
help of a simple numerical example. Suppose that the respective costs of the two
components of a hypothetical product are $9 and $7 in country A, $10 and $4 in
country J, and $17 and $1 in country M. When production takes place entirely
within the boundaries of each country, a unit of product costs $16, $14, and $18, in
the three countries, respectively, giving country J a comparative cost edge over the
other two.
When countries A and M form a free trade area and engage in production
sharing, with A producing the first and M the second component, joint cost of a unit
of the good declines to $10. While, neither country is able to compete with country J
without cross-border fragmentation, intra-product specialization enables them to
become competitive.
In order to assess the supply-side implications of cross-border fragmentation
and production sharing, we start with a partial-equilibrium representation of the
import sector of a partner country. In Figure 2, curve DD represents domestic
demand for the imported product, X, while domestic supply in the absence of crossborder fragmentation is given by curve Sx1+x2. The product is assumed to be made
up of two components, x1 and x2, where production of the former is intensive in the
country’s abundant factor. Line Sx1+x2* represents costs of production when the first
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component, in which the country is assumed to have comparative advantage, is
produced at home, and the second component is imported from a lower-cost foreign
source.
The shift from local production to cross-border fragmentation, represented by
the move from the first to the second supply curve, is welfare-increasing. If the
country is small and the price of product X is given at Po, then the gains from crossborder fragmentation accrue in the form of producer surplus (encompassed by area
bckf) and increased employment (implicit in the rise in production from 0q to 0n).
The value of X-production rises from 0abq to 0acn. Not all of this increase in value
accrues to the country, however. The value of imported component x2 is given by
area acdf. The rise in domestic value added is therefore equal to the difference
between areas ednq and abef.
Hence, both the quantity of X-production and the value of domestic
production increase. While this is clearly positive from the point of view of the
domestic industry, workers formerly engaged in producing component x2 have lost
their jobs. If those workers can find employment in production of component x1,
output of which clearly rises, they will remain employed in the industry and new
workers may also be drawn into the industry.
The buffer provided by outsourcing can be seen if it is assumed that the world
price of X is falling. In the absence of cross-border sourcing, domestic production of
good X declines along supply curve Sx1+x2, with output and employment falling in
the industry. Cross-border procurement of component x2, on the other hand, shifts
the supply curve out, moving production at the initial price to point c, so that when
the negative world price shock occurs, domestic production declines along supply
curve Sx1+x2*. It is evident, that cross-border fragmentation of production enhances
the domestic industry’s ability to fend off foreign competition.
The benefits conferred on domestic welfare by cross-border component
procurement depend on several factors, including the share of imported components
in total production. A rising share shifts down the Sx1 curve to, say, Sx1’, which
raises the share of foreign value-added and lowers the share of domestic value-added
and hence reduces the benefits from cross-border operations.10
The net effect also depends on the cost-savings inherent in offshore
procurement. A rise in savings widens the gap between the top two supply curves,
thereby increasing domestic production when the second component is imported and
raising both employment opportunities and domestic value added.
5. A Three-Country Model of Economic Integration with Production Sharing
The focus in Figure 3 is on import demands and export supplies, that is, on the
excesses between domestic demand and supply in importing and exporting countries,
respectively. Demand curve D1D2D3 represents the difference between domestic
demand and domestic supply in country A. It is the country’s net import demand
curve. Curve D3D3 is the country’s domestic demand curve; it becomes net import
demand at point D2, when domestic production goes to zero. Function Sj+t represents
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the tariff-inclusive net export supply of country J, while Sj is that country’s pre-tariff
net export supply. The initial MFN equilibrium, given at the intersection of net
import demand and country J’s tariff-inclusive net export supply, generates the
domestic tariff-inclusive price, Pd, at which country A imports quantity 0qo from
country J. Output of X in country A is equal to the distance cd.
Introduction of a traditional free trade area between country A and country M
reduces the price of X within the area to Pfta. This price is determined at the
intersection between country A’s import demand and supply curve Sm+j+t, which
represents the sum of tariff-free export supply from country M and tariff-inclusive
export supply from country J. Country A’s total imports expand from 0qo to 0q1,
while imports from country J decline from 0qo to 0q2. Imports from country M are
equal to q2q1 (equal to fh). Domestic production in country A falls to hk. The
reduction in country A’s demand for imports from J forces that country to lower its
supply price from Pj to Pj’, providing country A with an improvement in the terms of
trade.
Formation of the trade area generates the following welfare changes. Area
acge represents domestic welfare transfers from government revenue to consumer
surplus, while triangle cgh reflects welfare improvements due to trade creation and
the consumption effect. Rectangle fgsr represents welfare losses due to trade
diversion. It is clear that, terms-of-trade changes apart, the net welfare effect is
ambiguous. It appears to be negative as drawn, with the magnitude of the area of
trade diversion greater than that of the area of trade creation, but with steeper supply
curves it will quickly turn positive. Inspection of the figure suggests further that the
free trade area is more likely to be welfare-improving as the gap between supply
curves Sm+j+t and Sj shrinks.
For large countries, formation of a free trade area will typically involve
changes in the terms of trade, brought about by changes in the importing country’s
demand for goods from non-members. Area qrut (=abfe) gives the welfare gain due
to the improvement in country A’s terms-of-trade vis-a-vis country J. Terms-of-trade
gains help offset welfare losses due to trade diversion.
Suppose that economic integration between countries A and M is deepened
by introduction of cross-border component trade, such that country M is able to
reduce production costs of good X by obtaining certain components at lower cost
from country A. Reduced costs shift down country M’s domestic supply curve (not
shown), which in turn shifts out the country’s export supply curve and thus curve
Sm+j+t to, say, Sm+j+t’. This shift reduces the gap relative to country J’s tariff-free
supply curve.
Equilibrium moves from h to n, where the new joint export supply curve of
countries J and M intersects country A’s import demand. The intra-area price of X
falls to Pps. Relative to the initial MFN equilibrium, the area reflecting trade creation
and consumption gains expands to triangle cjn, while trade diversion is now given by
rectangle ljsx. The region of trade diversion thus shrinks vertically by rectangle fgji,
but expands horizontally by rectangle lirx. It is clear that the net effect is ambiguous.
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The first rectangle will expand and the second shrink as the supply curves become
steeper.
In this process of adjustment, area fhmi is the welfare gain due to the lower
price at which imports from country M are now available. Area lirx, on the other
hand, is welfare-reducing because low-cost imports from Japan (equal to quantity li
or q4q2) are replaced by higher-cost imports from country M.
The reduction in country A’s demand for imports from J is now larger than
in the case of a free trade area without production sharing, which forces country J to
offer still deeper price concessions. J’s supply price falls to Pj”. The welfare gains
due to this terms-of-trade improvement are given by area qxwv.11
Cross-border component sourcing thus allows country M to reduce costs and
those cost savings redound to the advantage of consumers in country A.12
The
magnitude of these benefits depends on the cost improvements brought about by
cross-border production sharing between the area partners. Greater cost savings
generate a more pronounced downward shift of the Sm+j+t curve.
The analysis of cross-border production fragmentation has thus far focused on
cost savings in the production of X in country M. As the discussion of Figure 2
suggests, however, country A may also enjoy cost savings if its producers are able to
obtain low-cost components from country M. Then, A’s domestic supply curve (not
shown in Figure 3) shifts down, causing A’s import demand curve to shift left in
Figure 3. This shift reduces the price of good X still further, generating additional
changes along all the margins discussed above.
Finally, cross-border fragmentation affects production of components. The
shift of X-production from country A to country M reduces component production in
country A. In the two-component example discussed above, the decision by country
M to source component x1 in country A raises production of that component in
country A. Production of that component will rise still further if country A is able to
achieve cost savings by procuring component x2 from country M and thereby to raise
its own X-output along the lines shown in Figure 2. These adjustments generate
additional welfare effects.
Taken together, the various elements of the foregoing discussion serve as a
reminder that in the presence of cross-border component sourcing, the shift of
imports of a finished product from a low-cost non-member to a member complicates
the welfare analysis.13
6. Concluding Comments
This paper has focused on the welfare effects of preferential trade liberalization
which is accompanied by cross-border component sourcing. When trade involves
finished products only, the extent of trade diversion depends on the differences
among product prices in the countries involved. When production processes are
fragmentable and trade integration gives rise to cross-border component sourcing,
the prices of final goods are changed and the welfare calculus is altered. This
possibility arises from the likelihood that a country may possess comparative
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advantage at the product level without commanding comparative advantage at every
stage along the production chain.
This issue is explored in both partial- and general-equilibrium terms. It is
shown that replacing imports of end products made in their entirety outside a free
trade area (FTA) with products subject to production sharing inside the area may
reduce the extent of trade diversion. Cross-border component sourcing among the
partners of a free trade area is, thus, capable of converting a trade-diverting free trade
area into a trade-creating one.
It is further shown that rules of origin, interpreted as policies to prevent
efficient cross-border component sourcing, are welfare-reducing.
Notes
Professor, Department of Economics, Claremont McKenna College; Address: 850
Columbia Ave., Claremont, CA 91711; Telephone: (909) 621-8012; Fax: (909) 6078008; E-mail: lowe@claremontmckenna.edu. An earlier version of this paper was
presented at a conference on “Structural Reform and the Transformation of
Organizations and Businesses” at Homerton College, University of Cambridge,
September 2003. Helpful comments from conference participants are gratefully
acknowledged.
2
See, for example, Arndt (2001, 2004).
3
See, for example, Arndt (1997, 1998), Deardorff (2001a, 2001b), Jones (2000),
Jones and Kierzkowski (2001) and Kohler (2001). See also Feenstra (1998) and
Feenstra and Hanson (1996).
4
Terms-of-trade effects of cross-border production sharing are examined in Arndt
(2001). See also Deardorff (2001a).
5
The implications of production sharing are examined in a two-country model in
Arndt (2001).
6
For a detailed workout, see Arndt (2004).
7
Aspects of the analysis in this section will remind the reader of the “effective rate
of protection.” For an initial treatment, see Corden (1966). For a recent assessment,
see Greenaway and Milner (2003) and for a comparative analysis of alternative
measures of trade policy distortions, see Anderson (2003).
8
In this framework, simplifying assumptions play an essential role.
Implementation of a free trade area is thus often assumed to shift trade in its entirety
away from the low-cost non-member country. Such an extensive reordering of
production is due to the assumptions embodied in this model. In the next section, we
use a three-country, partial-equilibrium framework to examine scenarios in which
non-members continue to supply the FTA market, while sourcing of components and
end products shifts to members.
9
The focus here is on the effect of rules enforcement on the production possibility
curve and through it on welfare. If B producers continue to source components
among non-members and to pay A’s tariff on those components, there will not be a
single price of X in the region. There will be upward pressure on the price of good X
1
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in A and downward pressure in B. The price differential between the two countries
will reflect the size of the tariff and the share of third-country components in product
X.
10
This development is reminiscent of Hong Kong’s experience in the electronics
and textiles sectors, where the bulk of production has gradually shifted to the Pearl
River Delta.
11
It is apparent that the welfare gains due to terms of trade changes will vary over
the range of possible FTA prices below the MFN price. The nature of the variations
is governed by considerations similar to those involved in the theory of optimum
tariffs. The elasticities of the relevant export supply and import demand curves are
important here.
12
These adjustments clearly have implications for trade, production and welfare in
country M. There are strong, but not perfect, symmetries with the adjustments
discussed for country A. For a closer examination of adjustment in a two-country
framework, see Arndt (2001).
13
Country J may also resort to cross-border component sourcing, in which case the
analysis is further complicated.
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